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through the principal towns on their route, especially O'Connell, who in his large cloak—a survival to all appearance of the ancient Irish mantle—formed a conspicuous object on the box of the landau."

much attention, especially in the smaller towns. We learn from contemporary account that O'Connell mainly arrested the public gaze. He sat on the box of a landau with a large cloak—seemingly a revival of the ancient Irish mantle—folded around him."

We need not delay on the question whether the popularizer owes anything to those whom he despoils. Here the object is rather to show that the author has not done the kind and quantity of additional work that we are justified in looking for. The expansion of the brief biographical sketch into the volume which should adequately represent O'Connell as the "Hero" of the Irish nation, would seem to have called for not only the popularizing element that is here supplied, but more especially such a fuller consideration of Irish conditions and development in connection with the hero's work as should adequately show the connections between them, and leave us with a clearer conception of what the hero and his work represent in Irish and British history.

Another very considerable element in this "expansion" is large quotations from O'Connell's papers and speeches. This is entirely praiseworthy, but the method employed is by no means satisfactory. Apart from the fact that no references whatever are given for such extracts, and that the exact dates are most irritatingly missing, the author reproduces this matter in the third person, though at a length usually as great as if it had been given in O'Connell's exact language.

In spite of these defects the book will be a useful one. It is clear and pleasant reading, is accurate and well-arranged (Fitzpatrick's somewhat confused and gossippy compilation is occasionally straightened out), and is animated by fair spirit and by generous though not extreme enthusiasm. The illustrations are helpful (a map of Ireland should have been included), and the index passably good. VICTOR COFFIN.

*The Forward Policy and its Results, or Thirty-five Years' Work amongst the Tribes on Our North-Western Frontier of India.*

By RICHARD ISAAC BRUCE, C.I.E., formerly Political Agent, Belúchistán, late Commissioner and Superintendent, Derajat Division, Punjab, India. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1900. Pp. xxviii, 382.)

*Eighteen Years in the Khyber, 1879-1898.* By Col. Sir ROBERT WARBURTON, K.C.I.E., C.S.I. (London: John Murray. 1900. Pp. [18], 351.)

THE Indian Frontier question is not a new one, nor have the problems connected with it received final solution, yet these two books will

do much to clarify the subject, for both are by men who know whereof they write. Mr. Bruce was the assistant and right-hand man of Sir Robert Sandeman and his book is, therefore, in great part a record of events already made familiar in Thornton's *Life of Sandeman*. The story of Mr. Bruce's life in India from 1862 to 1896 is one full of adventure and rich in political experience. Tribal management on the lines laid down by Sir Robert Sandeman was unknown when Bruce was first appointed to a frontier district at Dera Ghazi Khan under the Punjab government. The system then in force was that of Lord Lawrence; the main idea was that British officers were never to cross the border on official business, that they were to avoid every step tending to extend the frontier and that in the event of disturbance beyond British jurisdiction a punitive expedition was to be made if the case demanded. It has been called the Close-Border system, for non-intervention beyond the frontier was the maxim. In the Punjab a conciliatory policy modified the stringency of these rules but in Sind the protection of the frontier depended to a great extent upon a military force. Sandeman ended this in Baluchistan by his success in negotiating a treaty with the Khan of Khelat in 1876. His policy has been described as a "system of conciliatory intervention tempered by lucrative employment and light taxation." Mr. Bruce defends this plan as a policy of civilization and as the true and just method of stopping local frontier disorder and of protecting India when the great day of invasion threatens. He describes in detail the workings of the system, being so enthusiastic as to claim that it could be enforced among tribes other than Baluch; and, in fact, he denies that there is any essential difference between Baluch and Patan and says they are both "open and amenable to the same influences" (p. 19). It has usually been held by other writers that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between the two, that the Baluch is aristocratic, bowing to the decision of his chief, rarely influenced by religious bigotry, and not apt to join in fanatic outbreaks, and, on the other hand, that the Patan is more democratic, often refusing to obey his chief, who at best is only the head of the dominant faction in the tribe, and listening to priestly incitement to *Jihad*, the *Mullah* being often more powerful than the chief. The council or *Jirga* of the tribe in Patan territory is therefore a more factional body than in Baluchistan. Mr. Bruce bases his belief upon personal experience, but the weight of authority is against him.

During the years 1876 to 1888, when Mr. Bruce was with Sir Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan he assisted in the pacification of the Khanate of Khelat, in the opening of trade routes long closed but which were now to be guarded by former plunderers, in the creation of Quetta as an outpost of empire, and in the administration of Baluchistan, then enjoying its first decade of law and order. The last eight years of his service Mr. Bruce spent as Commissioner in Derajat division under the Punjab government. He had opportunity, therefore, to judge frontier affairs from all sides, and his conclusions in the larger political issues are the more interesting when we examine the opinions of another writer serving on

a different post and trained in a different school. Colonel Warburton, the warden of the Khaibar Pass, had if possible a more exciting career than did Mr. Bruce. His mother was an Afghan lady, a niece of Dost Muhammad, Amir of Afghanistan, and his rare insight and ready sympathy in native affairs may be counted as among his greatest gifts. His period of service was marked by great changes ; it was his honor to hold the famous Khaibar pass open to trade and travel "without a single European soldier or Sepoy being stationed in it beyond Jamrud." He left Pesháwar before the outbreak in 1897, but believed that he could have checked the tribesmen and kept the pass open in spite of *Mullah* fanaticism if he had remained on the ground ; and his chapter on the subject is entitled "the Khyber débâcle." As regards the cause of this frontier war Colonel Warburton is not explicit, for he says that within three months of the outbreak there was no disturbing factor, and though he tells the story of the Turkish agent at Cabul, he does not give it much credence. Religious bigotry and personal ambition seem to have been the most important causes, though both he and Mr. Bruce object to the theory of a premeditated united attack all along the border. The literary style of both writers is that of the man who lives in the open. Mr. Bruce disarms criticism by frankly acknowledging his faults and Colonel Warburton did not live to revise his proofs. Repetition is common, and in the case of Mr. Bruce the reader grows weary at the minute record of the multitudinous "thanks of the Government of India." The happy day of uniform and reasonable spelling seems to be far off if we are to judge by the divergent methods here shown ; and, since Sir William Hunter has given us a system which is at least workable, it is to be regretted that Indian officials should be unwilling to take pity on the reader, and should refuse to be orthodox in their spelling of Indian names.

In the matter of general policy Colonel Warburton is as emphatic as Mr. Bruce in declaring the old Punjab method to be a failure ; they defend the character of the tribesmen and claim that by having the right men in charge the entire frontier can be peaceably handled ; they deplore the use of the native *Arbab* or middleman in dealing with trans-frontier tribes, pleading for a single-headed frontier commission which shall do away with inconsistency and vacillation. The plan in vogue in the Punjab to-day appears to regard the punitive expedition with its rewards for the military leaders as a natural result of the Forward Policy ; in the meantime the "political" who maintains the peace along his section of the border is passed by. From another point of view the present policy is *prima facie* totally inadequate ; and it is much more expensive than that advocated by Colonel Warburton, whether it really be the Sandeman system supported by Mr. Bruce, or some modification of it. Civilization and frontier defense as well as the Indian budget would then be well served.